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One of the precautions that people are beginning to take 
seriously in interpreting Kirkegaard's writings is not to identify too quickly 
his own position with that which is expressed under the pseudonymous 
authorship of any of his works.l But there is a parallel trap which, while 
somewhat subtler in form, must also be avoided to prevent serious 
misunderstanding. Specifically, the danger arises that the initial neglect 
can easily spill over into attributing to him a critique of a counter position 
which he never really opposed. The purpose of this essay is to address one 
special case where such a dual confusion originates; it involves one of the 
most central topics in all of Kierkegaard's works, namely, the 
interpretation of time as it questions the very possibility of the self s 
conversion. This interpretation is found in The Concept of Dread? 
The point of ambiguity which needs to be exposed stems from not 
distinguishing between what Kierkegaard would hope to accomplish 
through his discussion of time and how he raises that issue in a context 
which initially supports a more "conventional" stance. From the many 
different allusions Kierkegaard makes, one would assume that he 
challenges a simplistic view of time as a "succession of nows," and hopes to 
arrive at, by way of contrast, a more sophisticated position which can mark 
the convergence between the temporal and eternal as the cornerstone for 
religious conversion. But while the assessment of his "mature" position 
may be correct, how he ultimately comes to it and what he opposes 
remains rather vague. Indeed, we attribute too much to Kierkegaard 
himself if we maintain that he substitutes his own "existentially" clarified 
concept of time for a derivative view of the same, of time as a linear series 
of moments which is inherited from the philosophical tradition. By 
drawing this contrast too sharply, by pitting a position held by Kierkegaard 
against one held by his "opponent," we would package his view of time in 
too ontologically pure distinctions. While these may be especially 
important to his successors, they prove completely foreign to the concerns 
originally provoking his inquiry. 
1 Cf. Kierkegaard, The Point of View for My Works as An Author, trans. 
David F. Swenson and Walter Lowrie (Princeton: Princeton University 
Press, 1941), pp. 537-539. 
2 Kierkegaard, The Concept of Dread, trans. Walter Lowrie (Princeton: 
Princeton University Press, 1944), pp. 74-83. 
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Unless we outline the context of Kierkegaard's analysis of time, 
we risk effacing the boundary separating him from the subsequent 
tradition of existentialism and hermeneutic phenomenology.3 This 
tradition seizes upon the issue of time as one of its most cherished themes. 
Specifically, a neglect for Kierkegaard's sympathetic way of treating the 
"conventional" view of time, of his dexterity in not characterizing it as 
"inferior" and polarizing it with his own, leads to the belief that he is on the 
way to a "radicalized" account of temporality. This is the vision of time as 
having a cyclical or elliptical form which decisively overturns the linear 
model that was pioneered in certain respects by Aristotle.4 
Needless to say, both Heidegger and current scholars of his 
thought, as well as those of a "post-modern" bent, have read Kierkegaard 
as pointing the way to a more dynamic view of time which can offset the 
dangers of a "metaphysical" allegiance to the "present," even to the point 
of viewing him as a forerunner to the "deconstructionist" overthrow of 
"congealed presence."^ By contrast, this paper contends that Kierkegaard 
does not necessarily reject the conventional view of time as a succession of 
moments; instead he allows it to play a factor in his attempt to question the 
interdependence of present, future, and eternity as a kind of transitive 
relation rather than as a movement exhibiting the circularity of 
interpretation. 
In developing this argument, I will first mark the source of the 
tendency to bring Kierkegaard into the existentialist-hermeneutical camp, 
while identifying the context in his writings whose careful consideration 
would allow us to address "his" insights on time. Second, I will spell out 
what constitutes the "transitivity" of time, thereby preserving the integrity 
of Kierkegaard's analysis apart from the interpretation sought by various 
proponents of Continental thought. 
/. The Paradox of Self-Identity 
Throughout the philosophical tradition, from Aristotle, to St. 
Augustine to Kant, and even up into the contemporary period, the issue of 
time has been inextricably interwoven with both cosmology and ontology. 
In a way that is not surprising but has never been fully appreciated, 
Kierkegaard does not explicitly begin from this background. Yet, his 
situation is complicated by the fact that theology, whose concern he voices 
3 Cf. Frank Schalow, "Dread in a Post-Existentialist Era: Kierkegaard 
Reconsidered," The Heythrop Journal, Vol. XXX, No. 2 (April 1989), pp. 160-
167. 
4 Heidegger, Kant and the Problem of Metaphysics, trans. James C. 
Churchill (Bloomington: Indiana University Press, 1962), pp. 247-255. 
5 Cf. John D. Caputo, Radical Hermeneutics (Bloomington: Indiana 
University Press, 1987), pp. 11-35. 
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in one way or another, has its own version of cosmology. Theology also 
proposes a corollary view of the "person" who, while created by God, later 
falls prey to sin and eventually shoulders the burden of a nature divided 
between "soul and body."6 Part of Kierkegaard's ingenuity is that he can 
acknowledge this portrayal, adopt its implicit anthropology, and yet 
accentuate different facets of it in a way that reveals an alternative side to 
the stereotypical vision of the world and of the self s place within it. 
Specifically, the theological version tends to view the human 
predicament as an outgrowth of cosmic forces with an element of necessity 
to it. Rather than voicing the metaphysical-cosmic question "why?", 
Kierkegaard instead appeals to the initiative that the individual himself 
can muster to confront the painful conflict at the heart of existence. No 
doubt the fact that the self exists temporally surrounds this conflict, 
particularly in view of what Christian cosmology upholds as one's "eternal," 
Divine destination. For Kierkegaard, what becomes relevant is not the 
why or wherefore of human being's temporal condition, but rather the 
demands and opportunities it presents on the pathway to achieving true 
selfhood. 
It is either too presumptuous or too trivial to suggest that 
Kierkegaard addresses the issue of time within a Christian context. For 
him, what is really important is how the crisis that is endemic to 
Christianity can ascend into the forefront of human concern, that is, what 
is the "potentiality" which the individual possesses in order to be equal to 
the challenge posed by religious faith. Kierkegaard refers to this 
potentiality as "spirit."? Yet, in a way that may be somewhat different than 
both Christian cosmology and anthropology, spirit is not itself to be 
defined as something "higher" vs. something "lower," as one side of an 
antithesis or of a later synthesis. Instead, spirit already encompasses any 
tension that can combine opposite terms. For Kierkegaard, it is not 
because man has been created to experience such a tension that he finds 
himself suspended between two conflicting poles of existence; it is rather 
the case that spirit already provokes in man a concern for the apex of his 
existence, thereby allowing him to experience such a tension, that is, find 
himself capable of being torn asunder. Thus, man is not bom with an 
"innate" sense of his dualistic nature, anymore than he is "born a 
Christian."^ 
The emphasis which Kierkegaard places on potentiality and the 
selfs engagement with possibilities has certainly lured subsequent 
6 Kierkegaard, The Concept of Dread, p. 39. 
7l bid., p. 39. 
8 Kierkegaard, Concluding Unscientific Postscript, trans. David F. 
Swenson and Walter Lowrie (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1941), 
pp. 537-539. 
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thinkers into seeking clues to a more radicalized conception of human 
existence. Yet the majority of these efforts, most noticeably Heidegger's, 
have labored under the assumption that this potentiality becomes 
meaningful only when it is linked with what can mark the definitive 
structure of human existence, namely, finitude? There remains a 
tendency to expect an ontological followup to Kierkegaard's legacy, to the 
demands of philosophical discourse. Consequently, there is a danger of 
forgetting that existence cannot be abstractly defined apart from the 
changes it undergoes, since it is these changes which render existence 
meaningful rather than the reverse. 
As is well known, the individual's transformation takes a religious 
form. To undergo this dramatic change, the self must be delivered from its 
oscillation between happiness and despair, and discover that its wholeness 
is achieved not piecemeal via specific efforts but all at once through its 
dependency on the Divine. In a way that may escape the ontological 
thrust of subsequent thinkers, Kierkegaard views possibility, the animating 
power of existence, as already chiseled with the features of the selfs 
development in the highest sense, as already drawn in the direction of 
exaltation. And yet that direction becomes dear only to the extent that the 
self has simultaneously acknowledged the option to move in precisely the 
opposite way. The individual entertains these options together, positing 
them at once; only by ascribing to this ambivalence can the self monitor its 
own transition to a higher state, the very path to realizing its identity or 
achieving selfhood. 
On the surface, Kierkegaard seems to suggest that the self 
undergoes a process of maturation from a non-religious to a religious 
state, a process which entails a temporal scheme between "earlier" and 
"later." For him, the issue of time is ultimately interwoven into a concern 
for the ultimate spiritual destiny of the self.10 But precisely here lies the 
importance of carefully assessing the emphasis that Kierkegaard places 
on pseudonymous authorship, both in respect to his position and that 
which he presumably would counter. For him the issue of time is 
prominent but it is not necessarily to be thematized in a way that admits a 
polarity of stances according to some preset program of ontology. The fact 
that the self is defined by its own development implies time; however, that 
development is one whose meaning is gauged from the standpoint of 
eternity. Insofar as eternity and time converge to mark the selfs 
transformation, the status of the temporal is dramatically thrown into 
question. Despite this interrogative spirit, Kierkegaard does not abruptly 
9 For a lucid adaptation of Kierkegaard in Heideggerian terms, see 
Michael E. Zimmerman, Eclipse of the Self (Ohio: Ohio University Press, 
1981), pp. 135-149. 
10 Roy Martinez, "Kierkegaard's Ideal of Inward Deepening," Philosophy 
Today, Vol. 32, No. 2 (Summer, 1988), p. 113. 
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dismiss the conventional view of time, but instead seeks to preserve its 
character although with a slightly different emphasis: 
So, then, man was said to be a synthesis of soul 
and body; but he is at the same time a synthesis of the 
temporal and the eternal. I have no objection to 
recognizing that this has often been said; I have no wish 
to discover novelties, but rather it is my joy and my 
darling occupation to think upon things which seem 
perfectly simple.H 
Subsequent thinkers have not taken Kierkegaard at his word. 
Acutely aware of the above paradox of individual identity, they have 
reasoned that in order to accommodate the impact which eternity has on 
the spiritual development of the self, Kierkegaard must challenge the 
traditional view of time as a succession of moments. Given the logic of this 
argument, its precedent inevitably resides in Kierkegaard's penetrating 
analysis of "repetition." There he emphasizes the selfs need to 
appropriate previous possibilities and continually to renew its own way of 
choosing itself or of making commitments. The inescapable importance 
of this account, when combined with the prior assumption that 
Kierkegaard challenges the traditional view of time (i.e., in a linear sense), 
provides all the ammunition necessary to propose a novel interpretation of 
temporality as an elliptical movement integrating all the dimensions of 
time-past, present, future—in a dynamic way. This small step, or 
extrapolation if you will of distinguishing Kierkegaard's position from that 
of his alleged opponent, proves to be all that is needed for Heidegger to 
associate Kierkegaard with his own version of primordial, ecstatic 
temporality.12 
To be sure, the elliptical view of temporality proves advantageous 
as a way of explaining the relation between time and eternity. According 
to this view, the eternal and the temporal are no longer to be opposed, 
which is inevitable so long as we identify time with a disjointed succession 
of moments. Instead, the movement of repetition demands that past 
possibilities are rediscovered in the future, thereby creating a tension 
between the extreme dimensions of time which together elicit the 
"present" in a dynamical way. As the juncture where a new level of 
meaning arises, the present then consolidates all the disjointed points of 
time so as to harbor within itself the very face of eternity. When 
interpreted in this light, Kierkegaard's idea of repetition suggests the self-
constituting process of time which includes an impetus apart from merely 
11 Kierkegaard, The Concept of Dread, p. 76. 
12 Heidegger, Being and Time, trans. John Macquarrie and Edward 
Robinson (New York: Harper & Row, Publishers, Inc., 1962), pp. 434-439. 
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chronicling events in sequential order. Even if one still subscribes to an 
otherworldly view, eternity proves relevant only insofar it partakes of the 
tension which joins the respective dimensions of "temporality" in their 
relation with one another. 
In seeking in Kierkegaard's writings the pattern for a radicalized 
view of temporality, the existential-hermeneutical approach implicitly tilts 
its interpretation to the side of finitude. Eternity thereby becomes 
something of a subset of temporality, to be purged of its otherworldly 
demeanor. Yet regardless of whether we judge this interpretation to be fair 
or overly "creative," from our standpoint it proves to be symptomatic of an 
indifference to the intricacies of Kierkegaard's method. The true danger 
does not lie simply in obscuring the infinite for the sake of recovering 
temporality as the root of "Being-in-the-world." Instead, the difficulty is 
one of assuming that the position that Kierkegaard allegedly rejects is not 
itself a part of the selfs experience of time which reserves for itself a 
certain proximity with eternity. Put simply, for Kierkegaard it is not as 
though there are two different versions pf time, one originary or 
"primordial" and the other derivative or "fallen."!3 There is only time itself 
and the way in which the selfs' transformation demands its participation in 
eternity. 
As we will see in the next section, Kierkegaard faced some 
difficulty in determining how to "express" this peculiar facet of time. But 
the vagueness and the ambivalence we find in his writings on this topic, 
particularly in The Concept of Dread, should not necessarily be taken as 
an invitation to seek further clarity by polarizing two competing versions of 
time. Rather, it should be a warning to us to take more seriously the intent 
of his method in employing a pseudonymous authorship. Given this 
observation, let us then return to the key passages in the The Concept of 
Dread where "Vigilius Haufhiensis" addresses the unique character of 
time. We will discover that it has more the character of "transitivity" than 
the elliptical nature favored by contemporary hermeneutics. 
11. Eternity and Succession 
Through his view of time, Kierkegaard responds to the quandary 
posed by the selfs existence. The self is beset by a concern for its own 
identity, in such a way that the very attempt to arrive at a solution through 
its own powers thwarts the desired goal. Undoubtably a parallel can be 
drawn between Kierkegaard's approach to this question and the 
hermeneutical consideration of "authenticity." But once again the impact 
of tilting the latter discussion in the direction of finitude becomes 
apparent. For in Heidegger's case, at least, authentic existence is 
intimately connected with the individual's seizing hold of mortality as his 
13/ hid., pp. 375-382. 
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"ownmost possibility"; time is thereby defined through the priority of a 
future whose finality provokes a regard for the self s own limitations.14 
To be sure, Kierkegaard resists this vision of time as radically 
finite. Yet his reservation does not distinguish what is problematic in that 
approach. Indeed, where he stands on the issue of infinite vs. finite is vital, 
but even more important is how his approach secures a definitive "goal" 
for human existence The difficulty in elevating a single possibility (e.g., 
death) over all others is that it restricts the self s choices to what already 
lies within its power; no room is left for the additional requirement of 
discrimination which comes from specifying a particular goal. What 
would pose the greatest challenge to choice, namely, a "dilemma," can 
arise only indirectly as an offshoot of finitude. As a result, the sharpened 
edge of ethical decision-making becomes dulled, leaving ethics to 
flounder in a way which Heidegger scholars have recently come to 
recognize.15 By taking as his point of departure the uniqueness of the 
Christian experience, Kierkegaard can elicit clues to the actual formation 
of self-identity, to the temporal character of the self. These clues serve to 
outline a definitive ethical stance. 
We cannot underestimate the importance that ethics plays in 
Kierkegaard's quest to illuminate the character of time. For it is not the 
desire to make time the axis of an ontology that defines his investigation. 
Quite the reverse, he asks how the self s awakening to its ethical character 
can allow us to ponder the ambivalency of human existence in its most 
concrete, i.e., temporal setting. Inherent in this setting is the emotion 
which can arouse the self from its slumber of indifference, exposing at 
once the degree of the individual's ineffectiveness in producing his own 
happiness and one's "power" of being able to choose as the prerequisite for 
spirituality. The mood in question, of course, proves to be "dread," which 
holds forth the self at the threshold of its transition from despair to 
salvation.16 
Kierkegaard suggests that the self endures the tension of crossing 
this threshold through its ethical posture. For in facing an ethical 
dilemma, the self discovers that it is already part of a relation, of a 
"synthesis" which suggests a further stage of development than where it 
currently "is."l? Ethics addresses this stage of development and points to 
the perfection of the self on a higher plane than where it now exists. But 
1 4 Heidegger, Being and Time, p. 309. 
15 Cf. Charles E. Scott, "Heidegger and the Question of Ethics," Research 
in Phenomenology, Vol. XVIII (1988), pp. 23-40. 
1^ Kierkegaard, The Concept of Dread, p. 40. 
I 7 Cf. C. Stephen Evans, Kierkegaard's Fragments and Postscript: The 
Religious Philosophy of Johannes Climacus (Atlantic Highlands: 
Humanities Press, 1983), p. 41. 
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precisely in acknowledging the possibility of this spiritual ascent, 
Kierkegaard simultaneously poses a problem as to the actual "identity" of 
the self. For the person only becomes who he is once having transferred 
the focus of concern away from a narrow preoccupation with his desires 
(spawning despair) to that higher source or "third something" that can 
sustain his existence. But even prior to this fulfillment there is a question 
as to the period in which the self is ignorant of its identity, an essential 
skepticism of not knowing even what is at stake in addressing one's 
personhood. The individual so completely masks his identity as to be 
unable to supply a focus for the search. 
In posing this enigma of the selfs identity, Kierkegaard turns to a 
discussion of time. Needless to say, his discussion is not as straightforward 
as one might hope, but is presented more as a "puzzle" in a way reflecting 
a certain inscrutability about the self. The delicacy with which 
Kierkegaard addresses time comes to light in an innocuous distinction 
that is quite easily overlooked. Specifically, he seeks a different 
connotation for the present in the guise of the "instant."I 8 For him, the 
instant is not merely a convenient synonym, but instead marks the way in 
which the present can concretely stand in direct contrast with its opposite, 
namely, duration. The point of this contrast is not to show the mutual 
exclusivity of the eternal and the temporal, but, quite the reverse, to 
amplify what is distinctive of the "present" so as to mark its intersection 
with eternity.I 9 This intersection will then become the new haven for the 
"ambiguity" which characterizes the selfs transition to spiritual fulfillment. 
If the self is in a period of transition, then what it requires to 
discover its identity is the alteration of the (fleeting) present into some 
semblance of permanence. This "duration" requires a peculiar 
complementarity between eternity and time, through a synthesis parallel 
to that which defines the self. "The synthesis of the eternal and temporal is 
not a second synthesis but is the expression for the first synthesis in 
consequence of which man is a synthesis of soul and body sustained by 
spirit."20 The ensuing stability, however, is not born from the cessation of 
strife, but instead marks the beginning of the selfs concern and only thus 
has the character of "eternity." But what exactly does this mean? Insofar 
as eternity is inclusive of everything, of all segments of time, the efficacy 
proper to it must be implicitly transmitted to the present as well. In this 
respect, the present is potentially eternal. Accordingly, the eternal 
character of the present amounts to a change in the quality and richness of 
whatever one experiences in it. Kierkegaard summarizes the matter this 
18 Kierkegaard, The Concept of Dread, pp. 78-80. 
19 Martinez, Kierkegaard's Ideal of Inward Deepening, pp. 115-116. 
20 Kierkegaard, The Concept of Dread, p. 79. 
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way: 'The present is the eternal, or rather the eternal is the present, and 
the present is full."21 
By the same token, eternity is not something which has already 
happened and is isolated from experience. It is not to be opposed to the 
temporal, even time understood as a succession of moments. Indeed, 
eternity acquires its meaning precisely because it can embody (given the 
underlying effect of dread)22 that which grants to the individual the very 
capacity for choice, namely, freedom itself. The eternal does not entail 
repose, but rather involves the discharging of possibilities that directly 
determine the self s ultimate development. From the standpoint of this 
development, however, possibilities arise from the future. Thus, 
Kierkegaard suggests that the "future is eternity." 
In making this division, attention is at once 
drawn to the fact that in a certain sense the future 
signifies more than the present and the past; for the 
future is in a sense the whole of which the past is a part, 
and in a sense the future may signify the whole. This is 
due to the fact that the eternal means first of all the 
future, or that the future is the incognito in which the 
eternal, as incommensurable for time, would 
nevertheless maintain its relations with time. Thus we 
sometimes speak of the future as identical with eternity: 
the future life = eternal life.23 
In drawing this equivalence, Kierkegaard establishes the relation which 
gives the best clue to his understanding of time. 
To adopt this clue, it is necessary to join the two extreme terms 
which have only been indirectly linked by the "middle," the future and the 
present. That connection cannot be made by logical equivalency, however, 
but must instead be drawn from experience itself. In other words, as the 
temporal dimension defining the contingencies of the self s existence, the 
present becomes the site for the enactment of all those possibilities which 
mark its spiritual development and its eventual exaltation toward the 
Divine. The present thereby defines time essentially, but not by itself; it 
instead does so by yielding to the future, thereby becoming the transposed 
fulcrum in which the self exchanges the contingencies of its desires for the 
necessity of its commitment. 
Thus, to draw out the threefold character of time, or its essential 
"transitivity," we can say that the present is eternity because it is sustained 
21 Kierkegaard, The Concept of Dread., pp. 77-78. 
22 Cf. Schalow, "Dread in a Post-Existentialist Era," p. 163. 
23 Kierkegaard, The Concept of Dread, p. 80. 
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by that movement which lends a certain direction to the eternal, namely, 
the future. In marking the covergence of all moments, the future 
resonates with eternity by defining the fulfillment of the self in each of its 
possibilities. Only through this description can we ultimately arrive at the 
central tenet of Johannes Climacus' view of conversion expressed in the 
Philosophical Fragments, the breakthrough of the eternal in time as the 
prerequisite for the disciple becoming "contemporaneous" with Christ.24 
Given the adequacy of our interpretation, we find that in The Concept of 
Dread time assumes a transitive character in which the significance of 
each of its facets depends upon its subsequent relation to the other. This 
transitivity defines what is most unique to Kierkegaard's discussion of 
time, in contrast to its alleged similarity to the elliptical pattern of 
temporality upheld by hermeneutics. 
If there is any loose thread which still needs to be tied, it surely 
lies in addressing the relevance of the "past."25 But the easiest response 
to what might at first appear to be an omission in our discussion of 
Kierkegaard lies in recognizing that the "past" constitutes a separate 
problem in its own right and needs to be examined in another region of 
discourse (e.g., in considering the character of "repetition"). 2 6 Repetition 
points to the need for the renewal of those possibilities which have already 
been opened up through the future. But the permanence of that renewal 
does not depend upon any elliptical pattern of time; instead it is the 
impingement of the eternal in integrating the future and present together 
which demands the kind of stance toward the past which is found in 
repetition. Thus, the very merit of the "method" we have tried to follow, in 
contrast to the rather presumptuous demand for a unified ontology, lies in 
sanctioning a certain dissemination of insight that does not have to be 
integrated into a final doctrine.27 The crucial avoidance of an initially 
24 Kierkegaard, Philosophical Fragments, trans. David F. Swenson 
(Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1967), pp. 72-81. 
25 Cf. Kresten Nordentoft, Kierkegaard Psychology, trans. Bruce H. 
Kirmmse (Pittsburgh: Duquesne University Press, 1978), pp. 131-135. 
Nordentoft suggests that at least within The Concept of Dread, 
Kierkegaard develops more of a "prospective" than a "retrospective" view 
of time. Whether or not we wish to characterize Kierkegaard's analysis as 
"psychological" remains open to question. 
26 "Repetition" (Gientagelse) means "again-taking," and is to be 
contrasted with recollection in the Platonic Sense. Cf. Evans, 
Kierkegaard's Fragments and Postscript: The Religious Philosophy of 
Johannes Climacus, p. 154. 
271 credit Caputo for seeing this, as much as I disagree with his attempt to 
make repetition the focus of Kierkegaard's thought. 
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misleading tendency by hermeneutics to adopt Kierkegaard as its 
precursor proves in the end to be the very point of exit for our discussion. 
Perhaps one might still wonder how accurate it is to describe 
Kierkegaard's view of time as involving "transitivity." Yet my goal has not 
been to provide an "authoritative" interpretation, as much as to appreciate 
some of the nuances in Kierkegaard's account of time. Only through such 
attunement can we become open to what he intended us to experience as 
a renewal of the Christian message.28 
2 8 I wish to thank Professor Roy Martinez of Spelman College for his 
direction in helping me to read Kierkegaard's enigmatic writings. 
